A simple statement from Michell (2000) … "psychometrics is a pathology of science" is contrasted with the content of conventional definitions provided by leading textbooks in the area. The key to understanding why Michell has made such a statement is bound up in the precise definition of measurement that characterises quantification of variables within the natural sciences. By describing the key features of quantitative measurement, and contrasting these with current psychometric practice in both classical and item-response-theory, it is clear that Michell is indeed correct in his assertion. Three avenues of investigation would seem to follow from this understanding: each of which is expected to gradually replace current psychometric test theory, principles, and properties. The first attempts to construct variables which can be demonstrated empirically to possess a quantitative structure, and then use these for applied and theory-based measurement. The second proceeds on the basis of using qualitative (non-quantitatively structured) variable structures and procedures. The third, applied numerics, is an applied methodology whose sole aim is pragmatic utility; it is similar in some respects to current psychometric procedures except that "test theory" can be put to one side in favour of simpler tests of observational reliability and validity. Examples are presented of what "practice" now looks like in each of these avenues. Where many of the 20 th century developments in psychometrics were mainly concerned with finding novel ways to manipulate and work with numbers and test scores, it is expected that psychologists in the 21 st century will begin to recognise that the "quantitative imperative" (Michell (1990) is not necessary to the scientific study of psychology. Further, where variables are sought to be quantified, it will be recognized that this "quantification" requires an explicit hypothesis to be tested, prior to the subsequent manipulation of any variable magnitudes by operations that rely upon an additively structured variable. It is to be hoped that psychology begins concerning itself more with the logic of its measurement than the ever-increasing complexity of its numerical and statistical operations.
1: Quantitative Measurement
" Quite simply, measurement is a procedure for identifying values of quantitative variables through their numerical relationships to other values. Take a simple example. We wish to know the length of a timber beam. This may be done by relating its length to that called a meter. It is to be found r meters long (where r is some real number). Here r is the ratio of the length of the beam to that of a meter and this FACT enables the length of the beam to be characterized. More generally, in measurement some (unknown) value of a quantitative variable is identified as being r units. A UNIT of MEASUREMENT is simply a particular value of the relevant variable. It is singled out as that value relative to which all others are to be compared. Let the unit be Y and let the value to be measured be X. Then a measurement has the form X = rY.... Measurement requires the development of procedures whereby values X and Y may be brought into comparison and their ratio assessed. Such procedures are the methods of measurement"
Michell (2001), p. 212 …
"Measurement, as a scientific method, is a way of finding out (more or less reliably) what level of an attribute is possessed by the object or objects under investigation. However, because measurement is the assessment of a level of an attribute via its numerical relation (ratio) to another level of the same attribute (the unit selected), and because only quantitative attributes sustain ratios of this sort, measurement applies only to quantitative attributes. Psychometrics concerns the measurement of psychological attributes using the range of procedures collectively known as psychological tests. As a precondition of psychometric measurement, these attributes must be quantitative".
What is immediately apparent is that this definition is absolutely clear, technical, and precise. It introduces the concept of a "quantitative variable" (one whose values are defined by a set of ordinal and additive relations). Further, such variables require a unit of measurement to be explicitly identified, such that magnitudes of a variable may be expressed relative to that unit.
Thus, as stated in the second passage, "measurement applies only to quantitative variables". Yes, this is a narrow definition for measurement, but it is unambiguous and technically specified as we shall see below.
Quantitatively Structured Variables
A variable is anything relative to which objects may vary. For example, weight is a variable, different objects can have different weights, but each object can only possess one such weight at any point in time. A quantitative variable satisfies certain conditions of ordinal and additive structure. For example, weight is a quantity because weights are ordered according to their magnitude, and each specific weight is constituted additively of other specified weights. Likewise lengths. Specifically (from Michell, 1990) , p. 52-53) … "The first fact to note about a quantitative variable is that its values are ordered. For example, lengths are ordered according to their magnitude, 6 meters is greater than 2 meters, and so on. Similarly the values of other quantitative variables are ordered according to their magnitudes. The familiar symbols, "≥" and ">" will be used to denote this relation of magnitude, "≥" meaning "at least as great as", and ">" meaning "greater than".
Also the symbol "=" will be used to signify identity of value.
Let X, Y, and Z be any three values of a variable, Q. Then Q is ordinal if and only if: 9) there exists a natural number n such that nX ≥ Y (where 1X = X and (n + 1)X = nX + X) (the Archimedian condition).
In such a case the ternary relation involved is additive and Q is a quantitative variable".
These nine conditions were stated by J.S. Mill in 1843, and later by Hölder (1901) within his exposition of the axioms of quantity. However, as Michell (1999) points out, the influence of Euclid's theory of magnitudes is present throughout the historical development of the physical sciences, and especially within Newton's Principia of 1728. In short, this is not some piece of adhoc philosophy produced to support a convenient argument, but rather, these are the bases for the kind of quantitative measurement that has evolved within the natural sciences.
Numbers and their status
Up to now, it has been possible to regard the properties of measurement in isolation of the numbers used to represent magnitudes. However, this third issue is also fundamental to an understanding of measurement. It is also perhaps the key to understanding measurement in its wider context. A representational theory of measurement in its broadest sense, states that measurement requires defining how an empirical relational system may be conjoined with a number system in order to permit an individual to describe "quantities" of empirical entities using these numbers. An empirical relational system like weight possesses an ordered structure with the relations defined as in section 2 above. For example, if a class of objects that possess the attribute weight can be compared to one another with a relation such as "being at least as heavy as", then the weights standing in this relation to one another are said to constitute a relational system. In essence, a comparison operation is required to take place between all objects in this system in order to determine whether the relation holds for any two such objects, and to observe whether the properties of the relations expressed in 2. above can also be observed using the objects that are said to possess weight. A numerical relational system is one in which the entities involved are numbers, and the relations between them are numerical relations. An example of a numerical relation is the set of all positive integers less than say 1000, with the relation of "being at least as great as". Each number can be compared to another and a determination made as to whether the relation holds for that pair. In fact, the same relations as expressed in 2. above can also be applied to such a number system (all positive integers). We can also apply such relations to real numbers, and observe the properties of the same relations but now using continuous quantities rather than discrete values. So, in the case of weight, the numerical representation of weight is achieved by matching numbers to objects so that the order of weights of objects is reflected in the order (magnitude) of the numbers.
The question that now arises is that of the status of numbers. If we treat numbers as an abstract system of symbols, that can be assigned as and how a scientist decides they should be used to represent objects within an empirical relational system, then we have representationalism in the manner of Stevens (1951) theory, p. 23 … "in dealing with the aspects of objects we can invoke empirical operations for determining equality (the basis for classifying things), for rank ordering, and for determining when differences and ratios between the aspects of objects are equal. The conventional series of numerals -the series in which by definition each member has a successor -yields to analogous operations: We can identify members of the series and classify them. We know their order as given by convention. We can determine equal differences, as 7-5=4-2 and equal ratios, as 10/5 = 6/3. This isomorphism between the formal system and the empirical operations performed with material things justifies the use of the formal system as a model to stand for aspects of the empirical world".
Thus, any numerical modelling of an empirical system constitutes measurement. Stevens (1959) stated perhaps the more familiar exposition of this statement as measurement as the assignment of numbers to objects by rule and that (p. 19) … "provided a consistent rule is followed, some form of measurement is achieved".
This seems a reasonable statement on the surface, and it is has taken the form of a mantra chanted by all undergraduate psychology students worldwide. But, it is deeply flawed.
What Stevens did was to remove the status of a numerical relation system consisting of the real numbers as an empirical system in its own right. Up until the 1950s, numbers were considered to constitute an empirical relational system in their own right. The system was self-contained, logical, possessed the required ordering relations that constitute both ordinal and additive operations, and, in the theory of continuous quantity, sustained the necessary ratios necessary for such a theory.
In short, both in the manner that scientists used them, as well as in their existence as a relational system, numbers were considered as empirical facts, not abstract entities. The existence of the empirical relations was presumed logically independent of the numerical assignments made to represent them. In order to assign a numerical system to an empirical relational system, it was required that the empirical relations could first be identified without necessarily assigning numbers to objects within the system. It was a prior requirement that whether or not an empirical relation possesses certain properties was a matter for empirical, scientific investigation. As Michell (1999) , p. 168 states … "Simply to presume that a consistent rule for assigning numerals to objects represents an empirical relation possessing such properties is not discover that it does; it is the opposite".
For, what Stevens was really saying is that it is not the independently existing features of objects (the properties or relations of objects) that are represented in measurement, but that the numerical relations imposed by an investigator in fact determine the empirical relations between objects. When stated like this, it is obvious to even the most disbelieving reader that this is not how measurement in the natural sciences has ever functionedneither is it a rational course of action for constructing and making measurement.
When one considers the real number relational system defined within the continuous theory of measurement to be an empirical fact (Michell, 1994) in its own right, and that the conjoining of this system to an empirical relational system (also considered to be a putative or actual fact by an investigator) is an empirical hypothesis rather than an assertion by an investigator, then the representationalism espoused by Stevens and psychologists since 1951 is seen to be an impediment to any form of scientific investigation, and not as Stevens saw it, a different kind of measurement construction that was applicable especially to the social science. To complete the picture, a definition of the process of quantification is perhaps the best way of summarising the content of the three points above.
The Process of Quantification
Michell (1999) It is to be hoped that the reader can now see why Michell (2000) calls psychometrics a pathology of science. It assigns numbers to attributes without ever considering whether those attributes can sustain the operations represented within the empirical numeric relation system so imposed. To assume that the manipulation of numerals that are imposed from an independent relation system can somehow discover facts about other empirical objects, constructs, or events is "delusional", just as Michell (1997) stated. But why have psychologists been so adamant in equating measurement with psychological science?
The Pythagorean or "Measurement Imperative"
The idea that for anything to be considered "scientific" it must somehow involve quantitative measurement, has evolved from Pythagoras (approximately during the 6 th century BC). His philosophy stated that nature and reality was revealed through mathematics and numerical principles. These numerical principles were proposed as explaining psychological as well as physical phenomena. Given that mathematics might provide the principles by which all phenomena might be understood, and given it can be considered the science of structure (Parsons, 1990; Resnick, 1997) , then it is reasonable to assume that mathematics could indeed be the means by which nature and reality might be understood. This was the driving philosophy behind the Scientific Revolution in the 17 th century. As Michell (2000) The problem with the original and neo-Pythagorean views is that they assume that all structures, entities, and phenomena can be described by the mathematics of quantity, using quantitatively structured variables. That much of the natural sciences could be described in this manner was taken as the signal that psychological constructs could be similarly measured, albeit with some initial difficulty. The original philosophy of Pythagoras had been distorted through the 17 th through 19 th centuries into a kind of measurement imperative. If a discipline could not demonstrate measurement of its constructs and variables, then it could not be considered a science. Since psychology, both for academic and financial credibility, needed to advertise itself as a science; it subsequently adopted the procedures and practices of quantitative measurement as found within the natural sciences. However, the quantitative imperative (Michell, 1990 ) was based upon two false premises: firstly that in order for any area of investigation to be considered a science, it must use quantitative measurement of its variables, and second, that all variables in psychology were quantitatively structured. Science is a method or process for the investigation of phenomena. It does not require that the variables within its domain of enquiry be quantitatively structured.
Quantitative science does demand such properties of its variables. Therein lies the simple yet fundamental distinction between a quantitative science and a non-quantitative science.
Psychological "measurement" as "something different"
Given the four critical points above, it is clear that Michell's use of the word "measurement" is concordant with the axioms of quantity, in that variables so measured possess both ordinal and additive ordered structures, with the appropriate ordinal and additive structured numerical system used to "represent" the empirically defined object properties. That there is little disagreement with the above is testament to the veracity of both the axioms and the status of numbers as empirical facts, within a logically independent empirical relational system. However, if
we apply this logic to the kind of variables used routinely in psychology, such as personality traits, intellectual abilities, IQ, preference judgements, attitudes etc., it is clear that as yet, little empirical evidence exists for any of them being structured as quantitative variables. What little there is has been explicitly tested using the conjoint measurement axioms of Luce and Tukey (1964) , which will be discussed below.
When confronted with this fact, for it is a fact, many psychologists retort that psychological measurement "is different from" measurement in the natural sciences. When pressed to explain the new axiomatic basis (or specific conditions) for this special measurement in psychology, there is complete silence. The issue here for many in psychology is not so much that Michell may be wrong in his exposition of the theory of measurement and continuous quantity, but whether what he states is in any way relevant to psychological and psychometric measurement. However, this "relevance" question is itself based upon a false premise. That is, that there exist different kinds of quantitative measurement which are relevant to particular domains of enquiry. There are not. The axioms defining quantity and the theory of continuous quantity that underlines quantitative relations and structures is not an "option", but possess the status of empirical facts. What is questionable though is whether explanatory variables proposed in psychology possess a quantitative structure such that they can be quantified in the manner of a natural science. This is the empirically testable "scientific hypothesis" to which Michell (1997) refers.
The strongest statement rejecting Michell's thesis was published by Lovie (1997) , in response to Michell's (1997) paper. Lovie states (p. 393) ..
"there are no absolute, ahistorical mathematical truths or methods, only locally developed and locally maintained collective commitments and practices; what the ethnomethodologist Eric Livingston has termed the 'lived work' of the practising mathematician (Livingston, 1986) ."
As Michell (1999) details, the definition of measurement and the process of quantification outlined in the 4 critical points above stems from Euclid onwards. Both Newtonian and the New Physics, let alone chemistry and biology are predicated upon these quantity axioms. This work and knowledge constitutes a human-race-wide effort. If this is what Lovie meant as "locally maintained" and "collective", it is clear that his criticism is actually no criticism at all. However, it is apparent from the remainder of his critique that Lovie really does mean that the axioms of quantity are constructivist "entities" -of no particular relevance to one area of investigation than to another, except that within which they are "maintained" by the investigative "collective". So, how psychologists as a "collective" wish to define measurement and quantity is entirely up to them.
The problem for Lovie is that whilst refusing to accept the axioms of quantity, like so many other psychologists who do the same, he is quite unable to provide any other definition of quantity.
Instead, it seems to be that whatever is said to constitute a "collective" is responsible for whatever definition (or not) they wish to propose. This will not do. The axioms above represent mankind's historical formalisation of what it has been engaged in for thousands of years. We all implicitly use these properties of numbers in our everyday lives. Our technologies and our very lives are constructed around these properties of measurement. But, psychologists seem able to decide that this "kind of" measurement is not for them, instead preferring "something else" without ever making explicit that which they practise. Well, this paper makes it explicit for them. It is applied numerics, not quantitative measurement. As a group they are entirely free to use whatever definition of measurement they wish, or even not to have one at all, but they cannot at the same time claim to be making quantitative measurement of psychological attributes, or make claims about how variables interact with one another or cause certain outcomes simply by using the numeric techniques of quantitative science.
Note that it is quite possible to retain recognition of the axioms of quantity, yet still proceed to argue that psychology is a "special science" that may require a different approach to understanding causality than the physical sciences (via some version of non-linear complex or non-quantitative methods). Even in Quantum mechanics (which is invariably touted by psychologists as an exemplar for "a different kind of measurement" or at least a "look how physics has changed" kind of statement), where uncertainty prevails in any measurement of the state of a system under a set of given conditions, the constituent system variables are themselves measurable as quantitative variables. For example, quantum computation using Qubits relies upon accurate quantitative measurement of absolute temperature in order to control coherence, as well as the quantitatively measurable components of electrical activity (Vion, Aassime, Cottet, Joyez, Pothier, Urbina, Esteve, and Devoret, 2002) . In short, it is not the measurement principles that change to suit relevant explanatory theory, but the very structure of the variables and the subsequent relations between them.
Those for example who use multivariate statistical techniques such as regression analysis, factor analysis, structural equation modelling, hierarchical multilevel analysis etc. are applying arithmetic operations that rely upon the properties of ordinal and additively structure variables.
The problem is not one of "permissible statistics" or that one cannot produce numerical results from such techniques, but, the status of any conclusions drawn remains in doubt whilst the quantitative structure of the variables so manipulated remains untested. As Michell (1986) However, even accepting the above might well be true, psychologists will then proceed to quote the doctrine of practicalism. The argument goes something like "regardless of whatever it is that psychologists do when they claim to be measuring something, in many areas a substantive body of knowledge has been crafted and created using the tools and techniques of quantitative science". Therefore, it is concluded that because of these practical and useful results which have real-world implications, the measurement issue is really a non-issue or of only minor importance.
This reflects the approach taken by Thorndike, espoused as early as 1904, that test scores may not reflect some quantitatively structured variable such as "ability", but they can be rank ordered, and by expressing the relative positions amongst the score range using operations such as reexpressing scores as standardised values, measurement with something of the accuracy and precision of physical variables could be achieved… Thorndike (1904) 
Avenue 1: Measurement
The problem that faces psychology is that the variables that are of most interest to investigators are latent or unobservable. That is, they do not exist as physical objects or material, which can be manipulated in order to determine the empirical relations that may hold between amounts of an object (like the length of wooden rods for example). Psychological variables such as intelligence, motivation, personality, self-esteem, anger, religiosity, beliefs etc. do not "exist" except as inferred constructs. Within physics, a similar problem could be perceived with "derived" measures such as "density". Density is not a physical object with observable units that can be physically concatenated or manipulated. It is derived from the operation of two other physical measures which can be manipulated, mass and volume. The operation between these two "extensive" variables is that of division -taking the ratio of mass to volume yields a value for the variable density. For each substance, the ratio of mass to volume is a constant. What was intriguing to some was how it could be proven that the combination of two variables could produce a third whose values were themselves ordinal and additively structured in the manner of a quantitative Examples of conjoint measurement using explicit tests of the three conjoint axioms within psychology are rare -however, an interesting one is that provided in Stankov and Cregan (1993) that examines the hypothesis that intelligence (as proposed to be measured by the number of items correct on a Letter Series task) could be considered a quantitative variable, measured conjointly by working memory capacity and motivation. The logic of the procedure for assessing whether Intelligence is a quantitatively structured variable is as follows:
Assume persons P 1 and P 2 obtain the same LS score , but they differ in the amounts of M and WM (as indexed by the M score and WM score s). P 1 has a higher M score than P 2 , but P 2 has a higher WM score than P 1 . What is being tested is the functional relation: Intelligence = M + WM. If this additive relation holds, then the differences between M scores for P 1 and P 2 = the differences between WM scores . The basic idea is that levels within either of the two attributes (M and WM) can be traded off against one another relative to the effects on the Intelligence variable. By acquiring values of Intelligence, W and WM (as LS score , M score , and WM score ) and comparing these values in the manner required to test the conditions for conjoint additivity, it is possible to empirically determine whether an unobserved, latent variable (such as intelligence) is indeed quantitatively structured.
Of critical importance is the realisation that Rasch item response theory is also an empirical instantiation of the conjoint additivity axioms (Perline, Wright, and Wainer, 1979) . That is, the construction of a latent variable using Rasch item analysis is no less than the empirical test of quantitative structure for that latent variable. The significance of this fact for psychological measurement cannot be underestimated. Bond and Fox (2001) Whilst the construction of variables that possess quantitative structure is now possible within psychology, a-priori meaning instantiation remains critical. As Barrett (2001 and has indicated, measurement without a clear a-priori theory about the nature of the variable to be quantified, is of limited scientific value. This is a point also elaborated upon within Kline's (1998) exposition of the foundations of what he called "The New Psychometrics". In essence, Kline was noting that substantive knowledge of psychological attributes and constructs was unlikely to ever be achieved if the debate remained locked around such questions as "which model for measurement is best?". Rasch scaling and additive conjoint measurement are the key tools required by scientists trying to establish empirically that a variable of interest possesses a quantitative structure. However, the task for a science is also explaining why such an empirical finding should be so observed. Simply scaling variables without consideration of whether what has been so scaled is substantively meaningful is a recipe for nonsense, as exemplified by Wood's (1978) demonstration of an almost perfect Rasch scaled latent variable of "coin-tossing" ability.
What the above shows is that it is possible for psychologists to construct and make measurement that accords with the axioms of quantity, in the same way as physical scientists construct and make measurement. It is clear from already existing empirical work that many psychological variables do not possess a quantitative structure, but as Bond and Fox (2001) illustrate, as well as in the many published Rasch scales, some considerable number do. Thus, this
is an avenue that psychologists may take, with some positive signs already that it is possible to maintain concordance with measurement. However, as Barrett (2002) A quantitative science is one that relies upon quantitatively structured variables for its measurement. A non-quantitative science relies upon variables that are mainly non-quantitative, using order relations, probabilities of occurrence of discrete behaviours, and structural analysis of data to provide explanatory coherence for its theories.
Perhaps the most obvious psychological example of non-quantitative scientific research is that stemming from Guttman's work with facet theory and the analysis of data structures. Guttman (1971) is an excellent exposition, with the article title "Measurement as structural theory". An entire school of psychology has arisen in Israel, founded on the principles of Guttman's analysis of data structures, rather than quantitatively measured variables (Shye, 1978 (Shye, , 1988 .
Essentially, this form of analysis uses both nominal (classificatory) and ordinal relations between amounts of any variable. These amounts, generally represented by ranks in the case of ordinal data, are the components of analysis. However, rather than concentrate on producing quantitative measures for variables, and relating these through additive operations, the non-quantitative approach looks for particular kinds of order within data, generally mapping these ordered "sets" in a Euclidean space. However, instead of relying upon the additive units implied in such a space, what is important to this kind of work is the regions in which certain order relations hold for certain variables, and not others. In order to assist the theory construction process, which cannot now rely upon quantity defined by order and additive relations, Guttman introduced facet theory. This allowed a researcher to conceive of theoretically important concepts in terms of facets of structure, which, along with the concept of a mapping sentence (as a means of expressing theoretically important statements in a formal grammar akin to set theory) allowed the computational methods for discovering structure (for example multiple and partial order scalogram analysis, smallest space analysis) to be used as empirical tests of these formally proposed relational structures. Wilson (1995) , and Donald (1995) provide extremely simple introductions to this area of research, whilst Canter (1983 Canter ( , 1985 This view is absolutely concordant with that of Michell. Facet theory has proven to be an extremely versatile and powerful means of relating psychological theory to empirical analysis of data structures. In essence, it is a meta-theoretical approach to empirical research, based in set theory terms, and deals with membership and classes rather than point-estimates on linear additive scales of measurement. Fifty years of research has demonstrated both its utility and credibility. The fact that it has not been used more as a means of investigation is again due to the quantitative imperative that many psychologists find impossible to avoid, alongside the practicalism that demands that almost every observation be reduced to a number or statistic for pragmatic convenience.
Another approach to dealing with structure in data is that based upon cellular automata and the science of complex structures and evolved systems (Coveney, and Highfield, 1995; Holland, 1998; Wolfram, 1994 Wolfram, , 2002 . This approach to understanding how complex systems evolve is based upon both mathematical and non-mathematical principles. An evolved system might well begin with a few simple rules which may be defined mathematically, but the evolutionary constraints can be qualitatively structured using order and category relations only, such that the system evolves in a highly non-linear fashion (no additive transformations are possible). Further, Wolfram's work with cellular automata showed how complex structures could evolve in data patterns but for which there was no mathematics to explain the formation of such structures (the concept of a cellular automaton was introduced within computational science by Stanislav Ulam in 1952. It is an abstract array of 'cells' that are programmed to implement rules en masse. Each cell may function only in terms of its "nearest neighbour", such that its output is influenced only by those cells adjoining it. These "lattice" models are now used routinely for fluid dynamics, porosity dynamics and cement hydration). However, such systems (the study of the evolution of artificial life being one such domain of investigation) do seem to mimic certain realworld phenomena to high degree of congruence. This kind of work is maintained as a coherent research strategy at the Santa Fe Institute in the US (www.santafe.edu), much in the way that Shye and Canter maintain institutes in their respective countries (Israel and the UK) for their nonmetric approaches. That these investigatory methods are not even known about in many psychology departments is testament again to the quantitative imperative that pervades current psychological thinking.
Avenue 3: Applied Numerics
I have introduced this terminology to stand for those classes of mathematical and statistical analyses that rely upon variables possessing ordinal and additive structure, using arithmetic operations that rely upon such properties, yet the hypothesis that these variables actually possess these properties of quantity is never tested. It is within this avenue in which classical and modern 2 and 3-parameter item response theory are prevalent. Also, the major analytical multivariate techniques of structural equation modelling, regression and exploratory factor analysis may also be found within here. Whilst the use of such arithmetic and linear algebraic operations can of course be implemented using the numbers that are said to stand as "measurements", and results so computed, it is the validity of any conclusions drawn that is compromised. For, as stated above, the conclusions drawn do not necessarily follow if the variables used are not quantitatively structured. To have produced test theories such as the classical or 2 and 3-parameter item response theory models is a testament to the mathematical prowess of the developers of such theory, but the theory is actually disconnected from any scientific study of psychology. Likewise, those who use the very latest developments in psychometrics such as structural equation modelling (SEM), hierarchical multilevel modelling, and latent growth modelling, are just engaging in an approximation exercise of uncertain validity, for no attention is ever paid to the empirical hypothesis of whether the variables used or introduced as "phantom" latents (Hayduk, 1996) in such models are actually quantitative at all. Instead, these models all rely upon the manipulation of the empirical number system, which is mapped onto an assumed empirical object-entity relational system. However, it is worth examining in detail the justification for this from at least one exponent of structural equation modelling. In a public debate with this author on measurement issues via SEMNET, a professional email listserv group that discusses issues concerned with structural equation modelling and whose message archives can be What is apparent from the above two responses from Hayduk is that he sees measurement within structural equation modelling as "something different" from that as defined by Michell. However, there is a fundamental misunderstanding that is prevalent throughout these passages, common to many psychologists who reject Michell's statements. This is that Michell's thesis and the axiomatic basis of quantitative measurement is viewed as somehow disconnected from some notion of "real world stuff", such that the definition for quantity and theory of continuous quantity is marginalised in order that the investigator can proceed with the task of "making sense of the world out there".
However, mischaracterising Michell is no answer to the issues above. Note the basis for measurement is the conjoining of an empirical entity relational system with that of a numerical relational system. The empirical relational system (whether including latent variables or otherwise)
is required to be investigated or defined independently of the use of any number system. Where a variable is unobservable (non-physical), then the empirical task becomes one of assessing whether a theoretically proposed mapping of numbers (which possess additive relations) onto the hypothetical quantities of the latent variable is justified. Additive conjoint measurement theory achieves just that task. Hayduk instead proposes that a model network of variables and additive relations, imposed as an a-priori set of measurement and relational statements, is also sufficient to assure an investigator that the variables used within such a model must necessarily possess quantitative structure, if the model fits an expected "population" covariance matrix generated from the observed data covariances. At first glance, this approach seems reasonable, for surely, if a model fits the maximum likelihood estimated population covariance data, then this must indicate that measurement has been achieved in the manner defined (all variables possess both ordinal and additive relations between their values)? The problem with this approach is that it confuses measurement with model fit. It is possible to model relations between quantitative variables, yet still achieve no-fit, because the model inappropriately specifies how these variables are causal for some outcome/s. Likewise, it is possible to model with ordinal-relation variables that are assigned numerals for each of their amounts, treat the numerals as though they represented the actual quantitative amounts of the latent variables involved, then obtain a model-fit to the population covariance data. For example, we might achieve fit with variables such as extraversion, selfesteem, religiosity etc., and so conclude that these variables now possess quantitative structure, yet, the quantitative structure actually resides within the numerical relational system and not necessarily the empirical relational system. The empirical relational system has never in fact been examined. Of course, it is always possible that the investigator has guessed right -and that model fit does indeed indicate that all variables possess a quantitative structure. The point being that fitting SEM models cannot test the empirical hypothesis of quantitative variable structure as SEM's arithmetic operations are constructed on the prior assumption that all variables must be quantitative from the outset. In fact Hayduk's position looks remarkably similar to the credo from Cronbach and Meehl (1955) about it, articulate to a greater or lesser extent the laws into which it enters, discover much, or very little about it. However, these activities all presuppose rules for the application of the concept that denotes it (e.g. intelligence, dominance). Furthermore, one must be prepared to cite these standards as justification for the claim that these empirical facts are about it…the problem is that in construct validation theory, knowing about something is confused with an understanding of the meaning of the concept that denotes that something".
So, as with the many models that invoke concepts of personality and intelligence as causal variables associated with certain phenomena, the knowledge is bound up in the numeric operations applied, rather than in the meaning of what actually constitutes an "intelligence" or "personality" variable. This is a subtle but telling mistake that becomes apparent when an investigator is asked to explain what it is that the observed test scores are said to be a measurement of, and how such a "cause" comes to possess equal-interval and additive relations between its amounts. This question is no less difficult to answer for a Rasch or additive conjoint measured latent variable. However, in the latter case the investigator can at least be assured that the variable can be shown empirically to possess a quantitative structure. In the case of applied numerics, such as with SEM using assumed quantitative variables, no such knowledge is available.
This matters greatly if a theory is proposed that relies for its explanatory coherence upon this structure being a property of some of all of its variables.
Whilst the above constitutes a criticism of psychometrics as a "science" of "psychological measurement, it does not constitute a criticism of it as an approach to the manipulation of numbers that are applied as magnitudes of hypothesised variables, for the purpose of approximating loose theoretical or pragmatic hypotheses. That is, if the process of mapping numbers onto psychological attributes is recognised from the outset as an approximation, with no great regard paid to the scientific value of such an enterprise, then this constitutes an honest approach that has indeed paid many pragmatic dividends. As the history of applied psychometrics has demonstrated, many variables have been constructed and utilised as predictive indicators of practically relevant phenomena (such as job satisfaction, employee well-being, personality, IQ), without any explicit theory of the meaning of the variables other than a "common-sense" meaning that is generally applied to assist in their interpretation. Although values for these variables are treated computationally as possessing both ordinal and additive structure, the interpretations of them are invariably made using ordinal relations only. In short, the enterprise is nothing more than an approximation that finds its definition of validity through pragmatic utility. This is not a "scientific" approach, but rather, a pragmatic approach. It is no less important for this, and sometimes the exploration of phenomena in this way does suggest avenues of exploration in a more scientifically-relevant manner. However, such an honest appreciation of the enterprise of applied numerics also opens up new vistas of assessing amounts of psychological variables, for which there need be no particular reliance upon test theoretic constructs such as item universes, item domains, or additive variable assumption statistical models of item or test characteristics.
Further, reliability and validity can be simplified into concepts that remain close to observed data (rather than invoking hypothetical "true-scores"), with validity defined more by observed pragmatic relevance than some vague notion of "construct validity". In short, the empirical value and stability of the procedures used define their validity, not a test theory that is predicated upon a set of untested assumptions. Necessarily, this limits the knowledge claims that might be made, but this is the price paid by not considering the precise meaning and constituent structure of any variable. That price is traded directly with pragmatic value in applied numerics. Applied examples of this approach can be found in the area of actuarial risk of violence of mentally disordered patients and sex-offenders (Quinsey, Harris, Rice, and Cormier, 1998; Doren, 2002) and in the monograph by Swets, Dawes, and Monahan (2000) on making diagnostic decisions using signal detection theory.
Within an organizational psychology area, that of selection and recruitment, an approach that discards conventional test theory in favour of making direct, useful, pragmatic measurement of psychological constructs is already a reality. This is the preference profile™ technology currently marketed by Mariner7 Ltd. What has been achieved here is a form of psychological assessment that does not rely upon questionnaire items as being a sample from some hypothetical universe of items (as in classical test theory), or on a model of uni-dimensional measurement of a latent trait as in item-response theory. Instead, the preference profile generates measurement in a manner similar to that which is referred to in clinical psychology as a "repertory grid" procedure, but which is reverse engineered in Mariner7's case as it provides the fixed, meaningful, dimensions within which an individual will indicate their preferences. This is an entirely computer-enabled graphical method of assessing an individual's job preferences, which are measured using 12 bipolar (opposites) nouns. However, as the design process evolved, it became clear that assessment could be made simultaneously in two dimensions: preference and frequency. Not only could the interface acquire information concerning job preference, but it could also require that an individual indicate how frequently they liked to be engaged in a job function for which they had expressed a particular preference. Figure 1 shows an assessment screen for a single work preference, whilst Figure 2 shows an alternative view which is also available to an individual to make their responses.
The essence of the task is that an individual can provide a self-report estimate of their work preferences in a cumulative fashion, without necessarily using numbers to express their preference (as in Figure 2 's exposition). profiler for personality assessment is also described and illustrated at this website.
In conclusion
The definition of measurement, quantity, quantitative structure, and quantification have been described above, based upon the work and publications of Michell. What is clear from this exposition is that the nature of quantity and the definition of measurement provided by Michell is axiomatic, specific, and descriptive of measurement in the natural sciences. However, what has also been made clear is that there is no necessity for investigators in a particular area to use solely quantitatively structured variables (or operations that rely upon these) in order to justify that their investigation is scientific. That a variable might possess quantitative structure is an empirically testable hypothesis, and not necessarily the "norm" at all in psychology (as it appears to be within physics). Given much of current-day psychometrics fails to make empirical test of the quantitative structure of the variables it purports to measure quantitatively, it is concluded that it is as Michell states, a subversion of the scientific method. Looking to the future in the light of this exposition, three avenues for exploration now seem possible for psychological scientists, one that attempts quantitative measurement of psychological variables, one that attempts non-quantitative structural analysis of variables and their classifications, and one that uses the full panoply of quantitative techniques, but is careful to note that the whole exercise is approximate to some unknown degree and seeks its validity in applied predictive utility. There is no reason that activities and results from within the application of the latter two avenues cannot provide the basis for attempting to construct quantitative measurement scales for certain constructs. But, given the clear distinction between the properties possessed by a quantitatively structured variable, and those possessed by non-quantitative variables, it is hoped that a more realistic appreciation of psychological measurement and assessment may be possible by many educators, practitioners, and researchers in the area of psychological measurement. This is why the term applied numerics instead of psychometrics is suggested as a reasonable and informative description of the kinds of activities that exemplify the third and rather attractive strategy. 
